Last month, the European Commission published a report about the demographic changes that are fundamentally reshaping Europe.
In it, Epimetheus points out, the Commission is admitting that the massive social engineering project of the past 2-3 decades – called invariably mass migration, migration crisis, climate refugees or whatever – hasn’t only been a sh*tty idea based on flawed assumptions; it’s a train wreck if there ever was one.
Another startling admission in the report is that without mass migration, Europe’s population is projected to be at least 32% lower, giving an indication of the huge number of people they are planning to import into Europe before the end of the century.
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Please note that throughout the article below, Epimetheus makes a play on the acronym for the World Health Organisation’s (“WHO’s”) Public Health Emergency of International Concern, PHEIC (pronounced “fake”).
Peak EU (Population) is Nigh – in 2030
By Epimetheus, as published by Die Fackel 2.0 on 9 August 2026
Table of Contents
Introduction
A few weeks ago, in the midst of summer, the EU Commission’s number-crunchers (lol, yes, they claim to have some) published this gem:
Europe’s population is set to shrink and age, creating challenges for the labour market, healthcare, care systems and public finances. But longer, healthier [sic, sure] lives also offer opportunities to boost participation, innovation and growth. Through targeted policies on skills, care, housing and regional development, the EU is helping Member States mitigate the effects of demographic change.
European population declining, but living longer than ever
The report, drawn up by the Joint Research Centre, confirms that Europe’s population is currently at its peak; with 450.6 million people today, the EU’s population is projected to be around 445 million by 2050, and 398.8 million by 2100, representing an overall decrease of about 11.7%, to a level experienced in the 1970s. [Emphasis added]
News Announcement: Demographic transformation in the EU: challenges and opportunities, European Commission, 14 July 2026
So, first up, isn’t this what virtually everybody would celebrate as a good thing for a variety of reasons, incl. anti-European hatred, Climatology and, of course, notions deriving from a fundamental failure to understand what the EU Commission has just admitted to: The massive social engineering project of the past 2-3 decades – called invariably mass migration, migration crisis, climate refugees or whatever – hasn’t only been a sh*tty idea based on flawed assumptions; it’s a train wreck if there ever was one.
Remember when we were told that the mass in-migration of often incompatible foreigners (strangers) would, somehow, save the welfare state and our way of life?
Related: Dutch Researchers Reveal the True Cost of Mass Immigration, Die Fackel 2.0, 22 January 2024
And now, somehow, in mid-July 2026, the EU Commission said the quiet part out loud(er) than usual; here’s the direct link to the report, with several choice quotes below. [Note from The Exposé: if you are unable to view the report on the European Commission’s website, you can read it on the Internet Archive HERE. For convenience, we have attached a copy of it below.]
The original is in English, hence I merely added emphases and [snark].
On (Net) “Migration“
From pp. 13-14:
On average, the EU population increased by about 0.89 million people per year between 2005 and 2024, compared with around 3.03 million people per year during the 1960s. Natural population change (the difference between births and deaths) remained positive but declining until 2011, and has been negative since 2012. This means that since 2012, more people have died each year than have been born. As a result, overall population growth has been driven by positive net migration [with the accompanying footnote reading: “Net migration represents the balance between the number of people moving into a country (immigrants) and those moving out (emigrants) over a given period. For more information, see the Eurostat glossary on migration.”]
Two things.
First, it’s fashionable, especially among the retarded, self-styled Dissident Right™, to simply point to 2015 – the opening of the borders by Angela Merkel’s fiat – and claim that all will be well, once again, if we only turned back the time to 2014; it’s a PHEIC Truth™, but true enough to obscure the root cause being (drum roll) the abandonment of EU-internal border controls, widely understood*, which is one of the four core pillars of the EU as a whole. I’ve yet to hear anyone from the retarded, self-styled Dissident Right to call for an end of “free movement of people” (the next time anyone talks about winding down another one of these pillars, the “free movement of capital,” will be the first time ever, including by the self-styled Dissident or Mainstream Left™, which is equally retarded on this issue). See these two exemplary, detailed enquiries into my home country’s misfortune:
- Replacement Migration in Practice: Official Data show Austria took in 3.34m Immigrants Since 2000
- The Biggest Policy Blunder of All Times
Second, note the PHEIC definition in the EU Commission’s footnote: “Net migration represents the balance between the number of people moving into a country (immigrants) and those moving out (emigrants) over a given period.” This deliberately conflates everybody moving across the border in the EU/EEC area, including, of course, yours truly: I’ve been an immigrant at least 2-3 times in my lifetime, moving from Austria to Switzerland (in 2010) and from thence to Norway (in 2020). Seen thus, the definition doesn’t make a lot of sense, especially as I’m paying a sh*tload of taxes (44% this year) and not getting a whole lot back via transfer payments. That doesn’t make me better or worse than others in most regards, but in regard to the issues discussed by the EU Commission, it does.
I’ll now throw in a third item, which is quite the outcome of sh*tty EU policies and very telling about the true nature of the PHEIC covid sh*tshow since 2020. The most damning bit may be this graph, found on p. 15 – squeeze your Mk. 1 eyeballs and look at the turquoise line (“net migration”) from around 2020 onwards: remember, moving outside your 6 ft. circle and/or across borders (heavens forbid) would “spread the virus” (or whatever), yet for some strange, inexplicable reason, “net migration” actually took off like never before:
But, sure, the mandates worked, they were sooper-dooper relevant, and, needless to say, nothing associated with “(net) migration” has to do with anything else. Or just pretend to PHEIC ask an expert.
On “Ageing“
Next up, ageing, discussed in the report right after the EU population’s composition. These snippets are from pp. 18-19:
Population ageing is one of the most significant long-term demographic transformations affecting the EU … Increased life expectancy has transformed ‘old age’ from a relatively short final life stage into a longer and more diverse phase of life. Most of the projected population ageing is expected to occur until about 2045 [this is where much of the taxes of everybody who’s of working age right now is gonna go] …
Longevity is not just about living longer – it is about living healthier, more active lives. Rising life expectancy is a major achievement reflecting advances in healthcare, living standards and social conditions. However, longevity is not merely about living longer. It is about living healthier, more active lives with greater opportunities, participation and wellbeing across generations.
One brief comment: sure, kinda fine, but the social security, or pension, systems were all set up between the 1930s (in the US) and the late 1950s (in Western Europe) when “old age” was “a relatively short final life stage” – and thus not horribly expensive for the taxpayers – do whatever you wish to label this right now.
With life expectancy estimated to rise to around 90 years by 2100, two major changes are inevitable: first, the retirement age will go up, slowly at first and then all of a sudden (I’m a university professor and according to current legislation, my retirement age is 72). Second, payments and entitlements will have to shrink as the share of seniors continues to mushroom while, at the same time, the share of people of working-age declines from 2030 onwards. It’s not my opinion or anything like this; if you have a problem with this statement, take it up with maths.
The ongoing demographic shift means societies must reconsider how they support individuals across longer life courses [told you so], while also safeguarding the sustainability of territorial and social systems. It also necessitates adapting policies, institutions and social attitudes to new realities of work, retirement, learning, care and intergenerational solidarity. The transition towards a longevity society also unlocks substantial opportunities. Longer, healthier lives expand the potential for personal fulfilment, civic engagement and continued contribution to society well beyond traditional retirement ages, giving rise to the silver economy – a rapidly growing market for products and services tailored to the needs and aspirations of older citizens [good luck with that, especially as energy, food and living costs are spiralling out of control].
I’d merely add one more thing to consider here: it’s the same virtually everywhere outside sub-Saharan Africa, with perhaps the US, due to a stronger pro-immigration ethos, being the one exception to population decline (for the time being). Truth be told, since this means, for the time being, that the US absorbs a sizeable share of able and willing young people, doing so, naturally, exacerbates the demographic woes of the countries of origin.
On “Fertility Trends“
Funny enough, the fact that the same report also discusses this is absent from the Commission’s press release is telling in and of itself. The relevant passages I’m citing here are found on pp. 19-22:
In 2024, 3.55 million children were born in the EU. Between 1961 and 2024, the highest annual number of live births in the EU was recorded in 1964, when 6.8 million children were born. From this comparatively high level, the number of live births in the EU declined at a steady pace, reaching 4.36 million in 2002. This was followed by a modest recovery, peaking at 4.68 million live births in 2008, after which a general downward trend was resumed, with small increases in 2014 and 2016. Live births in the EU fell to 4.07 million in 2020, rose slightly to 4.09 million in 2021 and have been declining since 2022. The crude birth rate was 7.9 in 2024. In comparison, the EU crude birth rate was 10.5 in 2000, 12.8 in 1985 and 16.4 in 1970.
Expressed in graphical form, this looks as follows:
At the beginning of the 2000s, the TFR [total fertility rate] in the EU increased from 1.43 in 2001 to 1.57 in 2010. It then decreased to 1.51 in 2013, followed by modest rebounds up to 2016, after which it started to decline again, reaching 1.46 in 2022 and 1.34 in 2024.
The fertility rates in the EU are projected to recover slightly by the end of the century, but remain below the replacement level …
Analysis of the link between family policies and fertility outcomes shows considerable variation across countries, periods and policy measures. Some studies question the effectiveness of measures expressly aimed at boosting births, noting mixed impacts on fertility and possible unintended effects on sexual and reproductive health, human rights and gender equality. Others suggest that well designed family support initiatives such as parental leave, childcare provision and financial assistance can influence fertility levels and timing, although the effects are typically modest and unlikely to return fertility to replacement rates. Fertility may also be supported indirectly by policies that promote work-family balance, gender equality, job stability and affordable housing [who would’ve guessed that].
Another set of explanations focuses on the gap between the number of children people would like to have and the number they actually have. Structural and economic factors such as perceived economic uncertainty, infertility related struggles, longer and more complex education and career pathways and high housing costs may [sic] prevent individuals from achieving their ideal family size. In addition, evolving social norms related to values and attitudes around having children, partnership, work life balance and gender roles are also influential. For example, the fact that Nordic countries, despite having advanced welfare states, high gender equality and strong support for families, are also experiencing declining fertility rates, suggests that deeper societal transformations may [sic] be underway. [line break added]
Declining fertility in different world regions with diverse socioeconomic, cultural and religious contexts is a process still poorly understood and analysed, affecting the global population [that means it’s a global thing].
Note, in particular, the issues about Nordic countries and their, of course, exemplary welfare state policies.
We’ve discussed the nonsensical nature of these policies recently: ‘With Fertility as Low as Never, Norway’s Birth Rate Committee Meets’.
On “Migration Trends“
These passages are found on pp. 22-25, and they aren’t mentioned in the report either (go figure).
On 1 January 2025, an estimated 46.7 million people born outside the EU were residing in an EU country, accounting for 10.4% of the EU population. Additionally, an estimated 18.0 million people born in an EU country were resident in another EU country, accounting for 4.0% of the EU population. According to the latest projections until 2100, the EU will continue to attract migrants. The projections suggest that net migration into the EU will be positive for every year from 2025 to 2100.
At this point, that last sentence is adorned with footnote (xv), which reads in full:
Migration is the most volatile and least predictable component of population change. The EUROPOP2025 model breaks migration down into four main flows: immigration and emigration to and from other EU countries, and immigration and emigration to and from non-EU countries. Each flow is projected by age and sex. For the short term (2025–2031), the model uses recent country-specific trends. From 2032 to 2100, assumptions gradually converge towards common EU-wide emigration hazard rates and per capita immigration levels, in line with the partial convergence hypothesis. A working-age ‘feedback mechanism’ is also included: in each year in which the working-age population (15–64) shrinks, an additional modest pull factor for non-EU immigration is assumed, reflecting the likely labour-market response to labour shortages. This additional inflow is set at 10 per cent of the annual decline in the working-age population.
Make of the following prognostications – really: reading of tea leaves – what you wish, I suppose, but this is what the EU is working with:
Even sustained [!!!] immigration is expected to prove insufficient [!!!] to fully offset natural population decrease stemming from low fertility …
Under a zero-net-migration scenario, the EU population would be 32% smaller – equivalent to approximately 130 million fewer persons – by 2100 compared with the baseline …
Migration can ease the pace of population ageing but not alter its trajectory …
While migration affects the size of the population, it cannot alter the fundamental shift towards older age structures. Settled migrants also grow older and eventually form a part of the older generations. Over time, the fertility levels of migrants also tend to converge with those of the host country, especially if they integrate and settle in the host society [we’ve seen this “already,” as the above-linked data from Norway and Austria show; I do think the EU’s demographers are a tad over-optimistic on this issue]. Thus, over generations, immigrants contribute to the same demographic patterns as the host society …
This is not a temporary disruption, but a permanent transformation in the conditions under which European societies evolve. This reality underscores the need for policies to adapt to – rather than seek to reverse – these fundamental changes.
Bottom Lines
Yet more evidence of the massive problems bedevilling politicos, legacy media and most experts.
Sure, fertility and child-rearing are touchy issues for many, but the single best one-stop treatment I’ve found is the work by Stephen J. Shaw (X profile).
Involuntary celibacy leads to involuntary childlessness.
Then there’s the apparent impossibility of politicos, experts and journos to both do what would be their jobs – which is compounded by their unwillingness to admit past mistakes, such as the family policies of the past half-century. Or the failures of welfare statism.
We’re, in fact, living through the long tail-end of a demographic crisis that commenced some time ago (around 1900, give or take) and that we’re seemingly incapable of understanding.
Our entire social welfare institutional complex is built on the demographic foundations of the 1920s and 1930s, as modified by the communising experiences of the Great Depression (US) and the two world wars (Europe).
These days, the social welfare complex is little more than a kind of charade that keeps going by mostly momentum (as it really exists): the current labour force is expected to contribute to retirees, with the remainder of contributions deriving from employers (payroll taxes) and government subsidies.
These funds are then pooled and poured into what is the functional equivalent of an escrow (social insurance or pension funds) that is, often, legally mandated to invest these funds in secure assets. While real estate has been historically the most secure asset (other than physical gold), guess what happens if these demographic realities – way more housing stock than future renters or owners – will manifest itself in the cubicles of lending institutions (commercial banks) … and if that thought revolves around, well, if real estate prices will have to come down as there’ll be a mis-match of supply (an inflated housing stock) and future demand (population decline), do venture a step further and consider what this realisation will do to financial institutions, social insurance and pension funds, government-as-we-know-it, and your personal future (no particular rank-order is implied).
I humbly suggest that authorities et al. stop pushing anti-life policies, such as offering synthetic hormones to teen girls upon their routine check-ups; stop pushing “Pride” stuff down the throats of society, which glorifies hedonism and normalises sexual fetishes over family values.
Penultimately, I suppose that the re-segregation according to the sex binary for career choices, trajectories – generous support for women in the 20s and delayed entry into higher education and the labour force without disadvantages vs. keeping the current model for men – might go a long way towards changing these very bad trajectories. I think doing that, by removing a sizeable chunk of women from the labour market, would do wonders for real wage growth and stable employment for men, which in turn is a clear incentive to start a family, perhaps coupled with low-interest home loans for families.
Finally, let’s consider the rule-of-holes: the sooner politicos, experts and journos admit their mistakes, the better off we’ll be at some point. The longer we continue down these worn-out paths, the ruder the awakening.
Hence, here’s my prediction:
- Less welfare state transfers and services will come, with higher contributions and higher retirement ages, a given.
- Cost-of-living spiralling out of control, reducing freedom of action for more and more people, which in turn fuels economic decline and financial distress (setting aside energy-related aspects for a moment).
- The attractiveness of the EU for migrants will decrease with less generous welfare payments forked over to new arrivals, to say nothing about too-big infrastructure (everything), especially as projections of population decline range between -12% (best case) to -32% (net-zero immigration) by 2100.
So, the main issue is: what gives first; EU politicos abandoning ship faced with massive electoral discontent over the crapification of everything, or the greatest-ever depression resulting from over-capacity meeting population decline setting in by 2030.
About the Author
Eipmetheus is a pseudonym for a professor of early modern and modern European civilisation at a public university “somewhere in the Old World.” He/she is the author of the Substack page titled ‘Die Fackel’. Die Fackel is a “webzine” which began in autumn 2021 with a few lines, mostly as a kind of diary or personal journal, to document at least part of the madness that engulfed Austria during the WHO-declared, so-called covid pandemic.
Featured image: Emergency African and Asian migrants and refugees on a ship in the port of Taranto, Puglia, Italy, 29 March 2011. Source: The National Interest
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